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NOT PRECEDENTIAL

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
________________
NO. 09-3693
________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
FRANCISCO ARCEO-GARCIA
also known as FRANCISCO ARCEO,
also known as JESUS RODRIGUEZ,
also known as JESUS NOYOLA,
also known as FRANK GARCIA
Francisco Arceo-Garcia
Appellant
_______________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Crim. No. 2-09-cr-00239-001
District Judge: Hon. J. Curtis Joyner
________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
November 2, 2010
BEFORE: SCIRICA, STAPLETON and ROTH, Circuit Judges

(Opinion Filed: November 5, 2010)
________________

STAPLETON, Circuit Judge:
Appellant Francisco Arceo-Garcia (“Arceo”) pled guilty to illegal reentry into the
United States. He was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 48 months.
In his sentencing memorandum and at his sentencing hearing, Arceo, an illegal
immigrant deported three times previously for unlawful entry into the U.S., argued for a
downward variance from his sentencing guidelines range of 46-57 months based on
several factors: his cooperation with the government, the “undue severity” of the sixteen
level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(a) for a prior drug trafficking conviction, and
the sentencing disparities among fast-track and non-fast-track immigration districts.
Arceo‟s fast-track sentencing disparity argument was the subject of considerable debate
at the sentencing hearing, and the District Court directed a number of questions to
counsel concerning it. At the conclusion of the hearings, the District Court rejected the
downward variance request but did not address the sentence disparity argument or either
of the other factors, stating only “[i]n reference to the defendant‟s motion for this court to
grant a downward variance, that motion is denied.” App. 144-45. 1 In his consideration
of § 3553 factors, the District Court discussed only the nature and circumstances of the
offense, the defendant‟s “involvement with the criminal justice system,” and the need to
punish him and deter others. App. 145-47.
Although the District Court may well have carefully considered the fast-track
argument and decided that the defendant did not merit any benefit from such a theory,
there is an insufficient record to support such a conclusion. Indeed, the record,
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Arceo-Garcia has only appealed on the basis of the fast-track disparity argument.
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particularly when viewed in the context of our case law at the time, is entirely consistent
with the District Court‟s having reached the result that it did because it believed it was
without authority to consider Arceo‟s fast-track disparity argument.
Section 3553(a)(6) of Title 28 of the United States Code provides that in
sentencing defendants district courts should consider “the need to avoid unwarranted
sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty
of similar conduct.” In United States v. Vargas, 477 F.3d 94, 96 (3d Cir. 2007), which
represented the law of our circuit at the time of Arceo‟s sentencing, the defendant argued
that “his sentence created an „unwarranted disparity‟ in light of the „fast- track‟ programs
available to defendants in some other districts.” The District Court refused to consider
such disparity in the course of reaching its sentence. We affirmed and agreed with its
reasoning for doing so:
[W]e agree with the District Court when, in addressing
Vargas‟ § 3553(a)(6) claim, it stated the following: “[W]hat
are prohibited under 3553 are unwarranted sentencing
disparities. And I think the other two branches of
Government, the legislative and executive, have made it clear
that in their view these are warranted sentencing disparities.
App. at 130-31 (emphasis added). That is, we agree that any
sentencing disparity authorized through an act of Congress
cannot be considered “unwarranted” under § 3553(a)(6).
Vargas, 477 F.3d at 99-100. In reaching our conclusion, we cited cases from nine of our
sister circuits which reached a similar conclusion based on Congress‟s approval of fasttrack programs in the PROTECT Act.
Shortly after Arceo‟s sentencing, this Court revisited the fast-track disparity issue
in United States v. Arrelucea-Zamudio, 581 F.3d 142 (3d Cir. 2009). In that case, we
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addressed the Supreme Court‟s intervening decision in Kimbrough v. United States, 552
U.S. 85 (2007), and Spears v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S. Ct. 840 (2009), and the
ensuing circuit split regarding the effect of these decisions on the propriety of a
sentencing court considering fast-track disparity. While we did not overrule Vargas, we
recognized the necessity of clarifying its holding:
We must clarify Vargas post-Kimbrough, however, to
the extent that is has been read – as the District Court did here
– as prohibiting a sentencing court‟s discretion to consider a
fast-track disparity argument because such a disparity is
warranted by Congress under§ 3553(a)(6). That
interpretation is no longer the view of our Court in light of
Kimbrough‟s analytic reasoning.
The fast-track issue should not be confined to
subsection (a)(6), which concerns “avoid[ing] unwarranted
sentencing disparities.” Instead, we hold that a sentencing
judge has the discretion to consider a variance under the
totality of the § 3553(a) factors (rather than one factor in
isolation) on the basis of a defendant‟s fast-track argument,
and that such a variance would be reasonable in an
appropriate case.
Arrelucea-Zamudio, 581 F.3d at 149 (footnote omitted). Because the District Court in
Arrelucea-Zamudio had understandably read Vargas as precluding acceptance of the fasttrack disparity argument in all cases, we remanded to provide it with an opportunity to
reconsider that argument in the course of resentencing.
Given the context of the sentencing in this case and the District Court‟s failure to
give any affirmative indication of an understanding that it was authorized in appropriate
circumstances to give weight to fast-track disparities, we are unable to exercise our
review responsibilities. Accordingly, as in Arrelucea-Zamudio, we will remand to the
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District Court to afford it an opportunity to clarify its position in light of our decision
there.
While the court would be within its discretion to sentence Arceo to a withinGuidelines sentence, and the court gave adequate reasons of punishment and deterrence
for sentencing Arceo as it did, the court committed procedural error in not ruling on the
defendant‟s disparity argument. When a matter is controverted, the District Court must
state on the record its reasons for denying a defendant‟s motion, Fed. R. Crim. P.
32(i)(3)(B); United States v. Wise, 515 F.3d 207, 216 (3d Cir. 2008).
We will vacate the judgment of sentence and remand for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
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